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ABSTRACT It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective
in character. But what exactly does it mean for ‘ordinary citizens’ to have collective obliga-
tions vis-a-vis large-scale injustice? In this article, I propose to pay closer attention to the dif-
ferent kinds of collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the
extent to which these are available to large, unorganised groups of people. I argue that large,
dispersed, and unorganised groups of people are often in a position to perform distributive col-
lective actions. As such, ordinary citizens can have massively shared obligations to address
structural injustice through distributive action, but, ultimately, such obligations are ‘collective’
only in a fairly weak sense.
Introduction
According to Corwin Aragon and Alison Jaggar, ‘structural injustice is an emergent
property of social practices’ where ‘typically unplanned and often unforeseen interac-
tion of a variety of systemic factors’ generate ‘nested networks of constraints and
opportunities’.1 According to Iris Marion Young, structural injustice exists
when social processes put large groups of persons under systematic threat of
domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capaci-
ties, at the same time that these processes enable others to dominate or to
have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising capacities
available to them.2
Structural injustice, then, is collectively caused in that it results from and is consti-
tuted by everyday actions of millions of people operating within unjust social institu-
tions.3 Examples of such injustice include sweatshop labour and the precarious
employment conditions in many developing-world garment factories,4 global poverty,5
or migrant domestic labour.6 We can easily see that environmental harms will regu-
larly fit the above description, too. Many structural injustices are global moral chal-
lenges.
But instead of focusing on how structural injustice is caused by or constituted
through collective behaviour, this article will look at our obligations to address such
injustice and potentially remedy it. It is often argued that the responsibility for
addressing structural injustice is in an important sense shared or collective.7 In this arti-
cle, I discuss in what sense we can share moral obligations8 to address structural injus-
tice. As such, the focus is not on retrospective ascriptions of responsibility and
blameworthiness for, or complicity in, existing unjust social institutions and practices,
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but on our prospective responsibility, that is, our moral obligations to change that sta-
tus quo.9
Aragon and Jaggar take issue with the notion of collective responsibility for struc-
tural injustice: ‘It is not hard to argue that most people today are somehow connected
with unjust global processes. But does this mean we are all responsible for all forms of
global structural injustice?’10 While they focused specifically on Young’s work,11 I
think their observation applies to the debate on large-scale collective obligations more
generally. It is fair to say that the oft-repeated view that structural injustice can only
be remedied by collective action and that our obligations to do so are in some sense
‘collective’ is notoriously vague and in dire need of qualification. It is my aim in this
article to provide such qualification.
In particular, existing notions of collective obligation fail to engage with the litera-
ture on collective action and epistemology. That is why, in this article, I propose to
pay closer attention to the different kinds of collective action and knowledge needed
in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which these are
available to large, unorganised groups of people. I argue that large and unorganised
groups of people are often in a position to perform distributive collective actions, but
that ultimately, our obligations to perform such actions will be ‘collective’ only in a
fairly weak sense. As such, the aim of the article is to reboot and reorganise an impor-
tant but lamentably muddled debate, but also, ultimately, to push for a novel distinc-
tion between weak and strong collective obligations and the significant conceptual and
practical differences between them.
Different Types Of Collective Action Problems
For each of us, there are three distinct ways in which we can take action vis-a-vis these
large-scale problems. We may
(1) Take direct action where we can individually make a difference; or
(2) Act as members of organised groups; or
(3) Act as constituents of unorganised collectives.
This article focuses on the third type of action and the collective obligations that ‘ordi-
nary citizens’ can have qua constituents of unorganised collectives (as opposed to
group agents). As constituents of unorganised collectives, ordinary citizens can per-
form cooperative joint actions or distributive actions – more on these terms later – but
such groups have no formal, enduring decision-making structure. Why do I focus on
(3)? Few of us have the power and influence to individually make a direct difference
to the kind of problems I am concentrating on here, as per (1). Regarding (2), clearly,
group agents such as states, national and international organisations, and corporations
and, therefore, their members have duties to address global challenges. Many more of
us can play a role as members of organised groups such as universities, corporations,
governments, and their agencies and other organisations. However, these agents regu-
larly fail to act on their obligations. Meanwhile, ‘ordinary citizens’ can still effect
change in the world, albeit only collectively. The third type of action is available to all
of us, and it can potentially be very impactful.
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I deliberately refrain from focusing on the ‘global affluent’ only – that is, those ordi-
nary citizens who can easily afford to make monetary (or in-kind) contributions. Iris
Marion Young argued that even those who are victims of injustice have some responsi-
bility to fix the problems they are facing.12 I will not take sides in this debate but
instead simply refer to ‘ordinary citizens’ as including all capable moral agents, keep-
ing in mind that obligations are not necessarily evenly distributed amongst them.
Most importantly, Young’s point that we ought to fight structural injustice by ‘join-
ing together with others in collective action’13 needs qualifying. To start with, we need
to distinguish different ways in which outcomes can be collectively brought about by
two or more agents. Genuine collective action is not to be confused with the aggregation
of actions. Let me explain each in turn: the latter describes outcomes produced by the
aggregation of independent individual actions where these actions are not intended to
produce that outcome, such as causing climate change through cumulative greenhouse
gas emissions. This kind of problem is often referred to as a collective action problem
in economics and politics. I am not using ‘collective action’ in this – very broad –
sense here. In any case, my focus in this article is on what I call genuine collective
action.
Genuine collective actions are either
(a) cooperative (interdependent) joint actions,14 or
(b) distributive actions resulting from cumulative individual contributions towards a
shared goal,15 or
(c) actions of group agents or incorporated groups, where the group’s agency is not
reducible to the agency of its individual members or the group has an identity over
and above that of its members.16
Since I am interested in obligations that individuals outside incorporated groups hold,
I will leave (c) aside. The remainder of this section clarifies the difference between
cooperative joint actions (a) and distributive actions (b). Let me stress that I am not
suggesting that these two types of action exhaust the whole spectrum of genuinely col-
lective action in unorganised collectives nor that they will always occur in the pure
form described here. Rather, in their pure form they represent two opposite ends of a
continuum. There will be hybrid forms, too. What I am aiming to show in the next
section is that these different types of collective action have very different implications
for potential collective obligations to address structural injustice. But beforehand, let
me give a more detailed account of the differences between them.
Dancing tango, playing a duet, or lifting a table together are instances of what I call
cooperative joint action. In contrast, people donating one million dollars to a charity for
disaster relief, or neighbours keeping a local beach clean by taking turns in collecting
rubbish, would count as distributive actions.
Cooperative joint action is highly interdependent collaboration between individuals,
and many joint actions cannot be performed by one individual agent as a matter of
principle, such as aforementioned duet playing or tango dancing.17 More importantly,
however, individual contributory actions cannot be performed in isolation, even
though they may be performed consecutively, as in coauthoring a book or an article,
where coauthors take turns.18
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In contrast, distributive collective action results from the individual actions of two
or more agents that are intended as contributions towards a joint endeavour (or shared
goal). Such actions can in principle – though often not literally – be performed by one
individual agent. A group (or set) of agents’ cumulative ability to produce distributive
action merely requires that a sufficiently great number of individual agents have the
ability to perform individual actions towards a shared goal and that they each have rea-
son to adopt that goal.19
Naturally, it will more often be the case that a group (or set) of agents have the abil-
ity to perform a distributive collective action than a cooperative joint action, since con-
ditions for joint ability are more demanding in the latter case.
For distributive collective action, the epistemic conditions are much weaker. First-
order shared knowledge of a joint or shared plan20 will often suffice: a proposition P is
shared knowledge among agents x, y, and z if each of them knows P (or else it is
shared knowledge among them to a degree depending on how many of them know P).
One might think that some knowledge of others’ intentions (concerning the shared
goal) is required for this action type: how can I intend to reduce my carbon footprint
with a view to the shared end of mitigating climate change, for instance, if I do not know
whether others also intend to reduce theirs? After all, for mitigating climate change it
is necessary that a large number of agents reduce their emissions, not just me. I sug-
gest that we need not know that specific others share our intention in order to form
our own, but we merely need to have a belief that it is likely that some persons share
our intentions (that is, have the same intentions as we do). Obviously, the more cer-
tainty we have about others’ intentions to contribute, the stronger will be our reasons
to also adopt such intentions.
For example, if I stop eating meat because current animal husbandry practices are
bad for the environment, then this may form part of a distributive action. Similarly,
people may be reducing their carbon footprint in order to contribute to mitigating cli-
mate change.21 Importantly, where distributive actions take place there is often some
kind of shared, publicly available plan, which ascribes individual roles to secure the
collective end. Public health campaigns may promote distributive action on important
issues, for instance, increasing vaccination rates. Individual contributions to distribu-
tive action tend to be straightforward and simple.22
Many collective actions, however, are significantly more complicated than that.
They require precise levels of (often sustained) interaction between participants. Peo-
ple in unstructured groups can perform such cooperative joint actions to a point. Usu-
ally, organised (or structured) agents will be best at performing such tasks, and
unorganised groups might transform into structured group agents when confronted
with such challenges. The more intricate the level of organisation in such a group is,
the more closely will it resemble a group agent. (But I am not concerned with that
part of the spectrum of genuine collective action here.)
For cooperative action to succeed, agents must usually have some second-or-higher-
order knowledge of a shared plan and others’ intentions. This will often be the case
where agents can directly communicate with one another, and these facts are ‘out in
the open’, so to speak. The strongest form of interdependent knowledge of this kind is
common knowledge,23 but weaker forms of interdependent knowledge24 may suffice,
depending on the action in question. For many types of cooperative action, for
instance, it may be sufficient that plans and intentions are public knowledge amongst
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agents. By that I mean a type of interdependent higher-order knowledge that is less
demanding than common knowledge: a proposition P is public knowledge among
agents x, y, and z if it is true that (a) most of them know P, and (b) most of them
know (a).25
The two types of actions discussed – cooperative action and distributive action – are
ideal types of collective action by unorganised groups. Some collective actions may fall
in between these categories or display features of both. However, roughly, they repre-
sent two fundamentally different ways in which agents in unstructured groups can
jointly produce outcomes (or perform actions). The important thing to note is that
many instances of structural injustice will require a variety of agents and groups of
agents to take various forms of remedial collective action.
Acting On Global Poverty – An Example
The aforementioned distinctions are important because they will ultimately help us
better understand the kind of collective obligations we may have to address structural
injustice. To illustrate this, let me have a quick look at some of the arguments made
in relation to our (collective) responsibility to address one of the most pressing prob-
lems of structural injustice, global poverty. In my view, authors rarely give enough
credit to the diversity of collective actions required to address this problem. As such,
arguments for collective obligations to address poverty tend to be too general and, as
a result, lack plausibility.
One observed tendency is to focus predominantly on distributive action solutions to
global poverty, for instance, when it is discussed as a problem of individual donations
towards charity.26 However, I think it is misleading to approach the problem of global
poverty primarily in this way. Both types of collective action are required in addressing
this problem. In my view, the topography of obligations concerning complex, large-
scale problems is complex and multifaceted, rather than neat and tidy.27 For instance,
a significant part of the problem of global poverty are unjust global trade agreements
and unjust global financial institutions.28 Taking action on both issues requires gen-
uine cooperative action at a global level, ideally by institutional agents. Short-term
poverty and disaster relief, in contrast, can be achieved by distributive collective
action. Cumulative donations to charities (and other contributions to their work) may
count as distributive actions in support of existing cooperative action.
Consequently, I also want to caution against approaches that portray ‘our’ duty to
address global poverty mainly as a duty to perform a cooperative action. Just like the
previously mentioned view, these approaches paint an unrealistically simplistic picture
of the moral landscape. One of these overly reductive approaches is what I call the
joint-rescue-analogy view. According to this view, just like two individuals can have obli-
gations to jointly rescue a drowning child from a pond if it takes two people to do so,
we can also have collective obligations to help those suffering from poverty globally.
‘We’ usually means ‘the global community’ or ‘the affluent’. Variations of this view
have been defended by Garrett Cullity29 and Bill Wringe, for instance.30
In The Moral Demands of Affluence, Cullity writes that ‘we stand under a collective
moral requirement of beneficence to help needy people through aid agencies’.31 He
claims that the life-saving analogy for donating to poverty relief as first put forward by
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Peter Singer32 should be understood as grounding a collective rather than an individ-
ual requirement ‘given the way that contributions to aid agencies are cooperatively
pooled’.33 While I agree with the gist of his argument, I believe that the thought
experiment underpinning it is unsuitable. In arguing against Singer’s view of obliga-
tions to assist the global poor as direct individual obligations to save lives, Cullity pro-
vides his own variation of Singer’s original shallow-pond case – the two-person ‘rescue
case’. He uses this rescue case to motivate the collective requirement:
A collective requirement of beneficence can exist when it is possible for us to
help someone together, even if none of us could have helped on her own. . . If
someone is drowning in front of you and me, and can be rescued only by
using a winch mechanism that requires two people to operate, then it is obvi-
ous that we are morally required to help him, even if neither of us could do
so single-handedly.34
A similar argument has been made by Bill Wringe, who defends the idea of collective
obligations by appealing to small-scale collective action scenarios: two people must
alert the owner of their building of growing damage to the roof and they can only do
this together, because only one of them can type the email and only one of them
knows the technical details to describe the damage accurately.35 Wringe argues that
they are collectively obligated to report the damage and extrapolates that the same
kind of collective obligations arises with regard to global poverty.36 His main argument
is that members of collectives that are not agents – such as the two people in the
building with the leaking roof, but also the ‘global collective’ – can organise them-
selves to become agentive.
Neither Wringe nor Cullity gives an account of what it means for a group to have
collective ability, but both implicitly assume that the kind of collective ability (and
therefore also the kind of collective action and obligation) involved in the small-scale
scenario must be the same or at least similar enough to the global case.37 This is sur-
prising, because a number of factors influencing the group’s ability to organize itself
and to jointly act that are present in the small-scale scenario are lacking in the global
case.
These factors usually include the level of epistemic cohesion in the group – the
members’ ability to communicate with a view to developing a shared plan towards
some desired end and allocating individual contributory actions, as well as the level of
interdependent group knowledge. Such group knowledge is often considered to be the
basis for shared or collective intentions – plural intentions that according to many
scholars are characteristic of (cooperative) joint activity.38,39 In any case, more sophis-
ticated forms of interdependent knowledge will usually increase people’s ability to act
collectively.
Large-scale collective action scenarios will usually lack the epistemic simplicity that
characterises small-scale cooperation scenarios invoked in the literature, where the
solution to a problem is obvious to the individual present. Further, in rescue cases
and similar scenarios used in the literature to motivate the idea of collective obliga-
tions, the agents’ willingness and ability to assist is usually instantly evident – people
can communicate effortlessly and reassure each other in the process of performing an
action or producing an outcome. Also, there is a certain moral simplicity to these
small-scale cases: they tend to involve one-off efforts, which pose a negligible burden
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on contributors while there exist no obvious competing duties. In short, I believe it is
misleading to model large-scale (or even global) collective action and obligations on
cases of small-scale one-off cooperation. The type of collective action that is available
at large scale to agents in unorganised groups differs starkly from that of small-scale
scenarios, because the nature of such groups and their collective ability will be very
different.
Large-Scale Distributive Actions
But we need not approach the question of collective ability of unorganised groups of
individuals (passers-by, commuters, the global affluent, ordinary citizens, etc.) as one
of ability for cooperative action in the narrow sense described above. Many of those
who defend collective obligations assume very different – much weaker – criteria for
collective ability and also a weaker concept of collective action.
The notion of collective action underlying Felix Pinkert’s view of joint duties is
more closely aligned with what I have called distributive action. Just like Wringe and
Cullity, Pinkert thinks that unorganised groups of agents can hold moral duties, pro-
vided they have joint ability. Pinkert distinguishes between mediate and immediate
joint ability to do x.40
Immediate joint ability to do x exists where there is one salient possible collective pat-
tern of actions that would constitute x-ing, and every agent in the relevant group
believes what is in fact her part to be her part.41 In cases where there is no such salient
pattern and the individual parts are not immediately known to the members of the
groups, or else, they do not (yet) have true beliefs concerning their parts in x, they
could still hold joint duties if they have mediated joint ability – that is, the capacity to
establish immediate joint ability: ‘agents can already be jointly able to perform actions
which first require them to coordinate’.42
In other words, if there is some preliminary step to doing x, which establishes their
immediate joint ability to do x, which is obvious to them and which they have the abil-
ity to take, then a group of agents have mediated joint ability to do x. This means that
they may have a joint duty to do x even if there is no salient pattern of action to start
with. On Pinkert’s account, then, immediate joint ability (and a joint duties) can be
present even if there is no communication between the different members of a group,
let alone something akin to interdependent, interlocking intentions.43
Pinkert’s criteria will often be met where simple, distributive actions are concerned.
Interestingly, though, he does not think that the global affluent (or humanity as a
whole) are under a collective obligation to remedy global poverty, for example. This is
because he believes that it would take us too much time to establish immediate joint
ability to actually save people from dying. That is, we would take too long to coordi-
nate in order to save all the lives that could be saved. I believe that this conclusion,
too, falls prey to an overly simplistic view of our obligations vis-a-vis large-scale injus-
tice: global poverty is a complex problem, and as such the obligations to remedy it will
be diverse and complex, held by different kinds of agents. It seems misguided to
assume that there could be only one all-encompassing collective obligation and one set
of conditions triggering that obligation.
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While the root causes of global poverty are best addressed by organised group
agents, the unstructured global collective of ‘ordinary’ citizens can, however, play a
supporting role and take up some of the slack left by those agents. Contra Pinkert, I
argue that we can have multiple collective obligations to address large-scale (even glo-
bal) injustice. With regard to global poverty, there do exist salient patterns of collective
action, and there is some shared and public knowledge as to how we can individually
contribute. One way to discharge our obligations is via financial or other contributions
to existing organisations which fight the causes and mitigate the impacts of poverty.44
Through their activities and information campaigns, these organisations make certain
patterns of group action and individual contributory actions supporting their work sali-
ent.
In practical terms, this means that those wanting to foster collective action must
ensure that information is spread in the group in the right way. To the extent that
information on either strategy – fighting the root causes of global poverty or mitigating
its impacts – is readily available, ordinary citizens are under a duty to jointly support
existing efforts to fight poverty and to therewith perform collective actions in the dis-
tributive sense. Donations, for example, can be seen as cumulative contributions
towards this kind of collective goal.
As mentioned previously, one particularly important factor for a group of agents’
collective ability is the knowledge or beliefs that group members share. Even though I
do not agree with Pinkert’s ultimate conclusion regarding our obligations vis-a-vis glo-
bal poverty, he – correctly, in my view, – highlights the significance of epistemic con-
ditions for joint ability. Pinkert emphasizes that it must be ‘obvious’ to the agents how
to play their part or that a collective solution must be ‘salient’ for them to have imme-
diate joint ability, but he does not provide much detail on these epistemic require-
ments.45
Scott Shapiro’s account of massively shared agency – collective agency of very large,
loose groups – is more concrete: He emphasizes that ‘shared intentional activity is
activity guided by a shared plan’.46 Shapiro’s notion of a plan in some sense mirrors
Pinkert’s concept of a ‘pattern’ and corresponding ‘roles’: a ‘plan’ contains a specific
end as well as specifying how to achieve that end, that is, which actions individual
group members are to take in order to achieve that end. So, what does it mean for a
plan to be shared?
A plan is shared by a group to J when (1) the plan was designed, at least in
part, for the members of the group so that they may engage in the joint activ-
ity J and (2) each member accepts the plan.47
Accepting a plan does not entail that each member know the full content of the plan,
but the content is publicly accessible for those who wish to find out. Further, accord-
ing to Shapiro, shared activity requires that each member intentionally follows their
part of the plan and that this fact – as well as the fact that there is a shared plan – is
common knowledge.48
I believe that Shapiro’s proposal is best understood as an account of distributive
action.49 But, depending on what exactly Shapiro means by ‘common knowledge’
(and he does not specify in the text), his epistemic condition may well be too strong
to capture the kind of massively shared agency that he is after and which we are
focused on here. According to the so-called iterative definition, ‘[a] proposition P is
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common knowledge in this sense if and only if everyone in the group knows that P,
everyone knows that everyone knows that P, and so on, for any iteration of “everyone
knows that”’.25 Clearly, if we adopt the iterative definition of common knowledge, we
have to accept that the global affluent, or members of loose and dispersed groups
more generally, cannot engage in shared activity of this kind. Group members may be
justified in having first- or even second-order (de dicto) beliefs about others’ knowledge
of the shared plan and their respective intentions. But if there is no direct communica-
tion between group members, the iteration will stop somewhere.
Shapiro’s account is more plausible with a weaker interpretation of the common
knowledge condition. Perhaps all we need in order to jointly follow a shared plan is
public knowledge of the shared plan. Public knowledge obtains where most people (or a
large enough subset of those who can contribute to the shared end) know the plan
and most people (or a large enough subset) are aware of that fact.
Yet even with this modification, Shapiro’s account is more demanding than Pin-
kert’s in terms of what beliefs and attitudes group members need to share (or have in
common) in order to jointly act. Rather than arguing that one account is preferable to
the other, I suggest that different types of collective action problems will require differ-
ent types of joint ability and differing levels of shared beliefs among group members.
Further, as I will indicate below, stronger normative (including epistemic) connections
between group members have implications for the obligations they can have in com-
mon.
In sum, I have discussed three issues so far: (1) the different kinds of actions that
are required in the fight against structural injustice, focusing mainly on the problem of
global poverty, (2) what it means for large, unorganised groups of people to have the
ability to perform a distributive collective action, and, in particular, (3) what group
members need to know in order to be able to act. The upshot was that in order for
such unstructured groups to have the required collective ability, there needs to be at
least one collective pattern of action, which, if realized, will fix the problem in ques-
tion, and this pattern is salient (or obvious) to group members. This includes that they
have accurate beliefs with regard to the role that they need to play in order for the col-
lective action to succeed. This pattern can take the shape of a ‘publicly known shared
plan’. The public nature of the plan will make it the case that group members have
some reason to believe (de dicto) that there are indeed other agents sharing that plan
and collective end. Importantly, knowledge has to be spread in the group in the right
way in order for people to have the collective ability to address a joint necessity prob-
lem. I will come back to this issue in the next section, when discussing the relevance
of normative links between group members.
However, so far I have said little about what it means to share obligations, or to
have collective obligation, as such. This will be discussed in the next section.
Massively Shared Collective Obligations?
To start with, let me briefly locate our discussion within the larger context of the
debate on collective obligations. With regard to concrete, clearly circumscribed dis-
tributive action problems, can large, dispersed groups such as the global affluent have
‘massively shared’ collective obligations? Or, in other words, can we – ordinary citizens
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– share obligations to address certain types of problems that are part of or result from
problems of structural injustice? I have already shown that large and dispersed collec-
tives can meet one necessary criterion for such obligations: cumulative ability, pro-
vided there exists a publicly known shared plan or an otherwise salient pattern of
action.50
There are four different ways in which obligations have been understood as ‘collec-
tive’ in the literature. Before I describe these, I will briefly mention the problem of
joint necessity, which motivates many accounts of collective obligations.
This is a feature of actions (and outcomes) that cannot be performed (or pro-
duced) by one person on their own, but require at least two people in order
to be realized. Joint necessity is analytic where it is part of what it means to
do x that x is done by at least two people, as in ‘getting married’. It is circum-
stantial where, as a matter of fact (but not as a matter of principle), an action
(or outcome) cannot be performed (or produced) by one person alone, for
instance, if it takes two or more people to lift a heavy object.51
Where it takes two or more agents to address some morally significant problem, as in
Cullity’s rescue case above, it seems that the capacity principle, or ‘ought’ implies ‘can’,
is not met. If neither agent can resolve the problem, it appears as though neither has a
duty to do so, which is counterintuitive. Hence the question is how we can ascribe
obligations to entities that are not agents in their own right or else how to ascribe obli-
gations to individuals that they cannot discharge on their own. The options discussed
in the literature are as follows:
(4) Suggesting that the two agents in the collective rescue case52 have an obligation as
a group. Two readings are possible:
(a) As obligations of group agents. The group consisting of the two agents holds
a moral obligation to rescue the person. However, this reading is implausible
because it is ontologically overcommitted. At the moment of encountering the
drowning person, the two random passers-by are not plausibly described as a
group agent. Further, under none of the standard accounts of moral group
agency do they become such an agent in the process of collaborating either.
Further, even if they did transform into a group agent proper, the potential
obligation to do so would encounter the same difficulty described above: form-
ing a group agent is itself a joint-necessity problem.
(b) As obligations of groups that are not agents. The two agents are not a
group agent in the strict sense, but they can hold an obligation as a group just
the same. This reply violates the so-called agency condition that only moral
agents can hold obligations. Some have suggested that the agency condition is
implausible.53
(5) As joint obligations of two or more individual agents. ‘Being jointly obli-
gated’ is considered a plural moral predicate54 which attaches to sets of two or
more individual agents.55 This requires a plural reading of the capacity principle
where [a and b jointly ought to do x] implies [a and b jointly can do x].56
(6) As obligations that agents hold individually, but the content of which ref-
erences a collective end. Each of the two agents has obligations to contribute to
collective action or to establishing such action.57 The problem of this
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interpretation is that, ultimately, no agent or group of agents has a duty to per-
form the joint action or to produce the collective outcome. Some scholars are
happy to bite this bullet.58 This is a distributive reading of collective obligations.
It would take up too much space to discuss the above readings and their differences in
detail.59 But let me suggest that they need not be mutually exclusive, and that,
depending on circumstances, the nature of collective obligations may vary. All of the
above will yield the conclusion that individuals in unstructured collectives have some
obligations to contribute to improving large-scale collective action problems.60
Examples of the kind of distributive actions I am interested in include donations
towards charities that aim at sustained political and economic change, individual beha-
vioural change where our standard practices cause collective harm to those who are
already disadvantaged (as in reducing our carbon footprint or purchasing certain con-
sumer goods), and similar types of distributive actions. But in what sense would such
obligations still be ‘collective’?
Normative primacy of the collective level: As mentioned above, one reason for constru-
ing obligations as collective is to account for the fact that, with regard to problems of
structural injustice (or, more generally, large-scale collective action problems), no indi-
vidual’s actions taken in isolation will fix the problem (joint necessity). Rather, it is
the collective ability of a set of agents to produce an outcome or perform an action,
which is seen as grounding such obligations. Further, in many cases, an individual’s
omission or inaction may not even make a difference for the worse, namely where
there are more potential contributors to solving a problem than minimally necessary,
that is, when we are then faced with a wide joint necessity case.61 For instance, wide
joint necessity obtains if in the rescue case above there are five bystanders but only
two are required in order to save the child. If our obligations depended on our unique
ability to make a difference to an outcome, then none of the bystanders in this case
would have an obligation to intervene. After all, if they fail to act there are still others
who could help the drowning person. This dilemma is avoided if, as several scholars
proposed, the collective level is considered primary and the question of individual obli-
gations as secondary.62 Note that this move is not available to the third interpretation
of collective duties mentioned above.
Framing the idea of normative primacy of the collective level in terms of moral
deliberation, one might say that a collectively optimal pattern of action can give indi-
viduals group-based (or pattern-based) reasons for action even where their individual
actions make no direct causal contribution to the realization of that pattern, for
instance when the outcome is overdetermined.63 Alternatively, one might say that an
obligation is collective when individual agents have reason to deliberate from the point
of view of the group.64 In other words, the normative primacy of the collective level
could be interpreted as metaphysical, functional, or deliberative. I suggest calling obli-
gations of this kind ‘weakly’ collective obligations.
Normative links between agents: Another way to understand the collective character of
moral obligations is to think of them as generating special normative links between
members of said collectives. I suggest to call this a ‘strongly collective’ understanding
of such obligations. For a set of agents to collectively have an obligation may require
them to take some responsibility for the success of the collective action, such as coor-
dinating the joint activity, and generating the kind of group knowledge required for
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the group members to be able to fulfil their contributory actions. Further, it may mean
that group members have to take up the slack left by others, essentially requiring them
to contribute beyond what their ideal fair share would have been. Finally, group mem-
bers may also be linked by considerations of fairness in the distribution of contributory
roles.65 All this, however, presupposes that certain epistemic conditions hold within
the group, for example, that information is shared in the right way.
Our obligations to perform the kind of distributive actions that I have been mainly
focusing on would be weakly collective in that the collective level has normative pri-
macy. However, normative links between group members will bolster the collective
character of obligations. This second aspect of (some) obligations’ collective character
may be crucial in putting both rational and psychological pressure onto agents to actu-
ally discharge those duties. Such links will strengthen moral reasons and moral resolve,
potentially turning pro tanto into all-out duties and making certain collective actions
not just epistemically salient but normatively salient.
Such normative links can strengthen moral reasons in favour of collective options by
making collective patterns of action salient over individual patterns of action. When
facing collective action problems, individual deliberating agents are regularly torn
between individually efficacious actions and collectively available options. In other
words, there is a tension between choices that make a direct difference and those
whose success depends on how others choose.66 Adequate information flow within
groups concerning other agents’ choices can make specific group patterns salient as
well as lowering the risks involved with picking collectively available options generally.
Group members who can directly communicate can jointly work out strategies for
optimal action via team reasoning.67 In epistemically more tightly knit (and yet
unstructured) groups, compliant members are more likely to know about others’
defections, giving them an opportunity to pick up the slack left by the defectors in
order to secure the group goal. Arguably, under certain conditions, group members,
even in unstructured groups, have obligations to take on more than their ideal fair
share of costs when discharging obligations.68
The greater a group’s epistemic cohesion the more likely is there to be a robust
sense of group membership and identity. We have learned from research in social psy-
chology that a sense of group membership will enhance cooperative behaviour.69 It is
therefore desirable, from the point of view of combating structural injustice via large-
scale collective action, to distribute information in the right way so as to generate a
stronger sense of group identity and mutual accountability.
Ultimately, most moral agents will hold a variety of different – individual and collec-
tive – obligations to contribute to addressing structural injustice. Some of these obliga-
tions will focus more narrowly on cooperative actions, some on distributive actions,
and many on actions that will fall in between these two types. Further, I think Young
had it right when she suggested that the degree of individual agents’ obligations (or
responsibility) is determined by a number of factors including the power they have to
make a difference, the degree to which they benefit from the injustice (‘privilege’), the
degree to with they are impacted by it (‘interest’), and finally the ability for organising
collective action, ‘the relative ease with which people can organize collective action to
address an injustice can be a useful decision principle’.70 I would add, though, that
our obligations also depend on the type of problem we are attempting to address, the
kind of action that is required to remedy it, and the kind of contribution we can make
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to it. Many of us will not be in a position to initiate collective action, but merely to
contribute to existing endeavours. This, too, is a way of discharging our collective
obligations. In sum, I believe that our moral obligations vis-a-vis complex moral prob-
lems are best understood as a polycentric cluster of collective and individual obliga-
tions. My focus, however, has been on a particular subtype of our obligations to
address structural injustice, namely those that are most easily had – obligations to con-
tribute to large-scale distributive action, or massively shared obligations.
Conclusion
Our starting point was the oft-made claim that structural injustice can only be reme-
died by collective action and the view that the responsibility or obligation to do so is
shared among many people. I suggested that this view is too general and is in need of
qualification. This is in part because it fails to take into account the differences
between the kinds of actions we can perform together with others and the types of
group-based knowledge required for successful collective endeavours.
I then distinguished between two generic types of collective action: cooperative
action and distributive action, whereby the former is a more sophisticated, interdepen-
dent type of joint action, while the latter is collective action in a looser sense, with
individuals intentionally contributing to a shared goal. Distributive action, I argued, is
the type of large-scale collective action most readily available to ‘ordinary people’. I
showed that large, dispersed collectives (such as the global affluent for instance) do
have joint ability with regard to such actions, provided certain epistemic conditions are
met. I argued that, depending on the problem at hand, people in unorganised collec-
tives need first-order (and possible higher) knowledge of a shared plan.
Finally, massively shared obligations, that is, ordinary citizens’ obligations to
address large-scale moral problems through distributive action, are collective only in
a very weak sense. Against that backdrop, it is easy to see that strengthening norma-
tive and epistemic links between agents in unorganised groups would change the
nature of their obligations and would, in fact, increase normative pressure to con-
tribute to collective action. Practically, this means that fostering collective action
may require strengthening the sense of group identity and membership, spreading
information in ways that enough group members have access to publicly available
shared plans that make salient the required individual contributory actions and pro-
viding feedback to the group on members’ actions and contributions. Research in
social psychology demonstrates that it is a sense of group membership combined
with information on positive, that is, compliant, behaviour of others that increases
people’s willingness to contribute to collective causes.71 Strongly collective obliga-
tions, where agents have some responsibility for the success of the group action and
for others’ actions and levels of knowledge are more desirable from the point of view
of addressing structural injustice, but harder to generate. Importantly, strengthening
those normative links is an action that may not readily be available to agents in large
and dispersed unorganised groups.
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